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Preschool children were tested for their ability to vary the verbal information
they offered regarding an object’s location depending on whether the person
searching for that object was likely to infer or misinfer its location. Older
children (mean age: 5 years 3 months) offered information in a selective
fashion: If the location of the hidden object could be readily inferred by their
conversation partner, they indicated its location only when explicitly asked but
if its location was likely to be misinferred, they often indicated that location
prior to being explicitly asked. The response pattern of younger children
(mean age: 3 years 6 months) was less conclusive. A relatively large number of
younger children took matters “into their own hands” and immediately
grasped for the concealed object, irrespective of whether its location could be
readily inferred. However, the reactions of the remaining 3-year-olds suggest
that even at this age children may be sensitive to the likely beliefs of their
conversation partner.
A wealth of recent research has shown that young children improve between
3 and 5 years in their understanding of beliefs. This age change is especially
evident with respect to false beliefs. Thus, children improve in the ability to
predict the way that a false belief will inuence a person’s actions (Wimmer
& Perner, 1983), statements (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Wimmer & Hartl,
1991), and emotions (Avis & Harris, 1991; Harris, Johnson, Hutton,
Andrews, & Cooke, 1989). During this same period, children also improve in
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their ability to produce actions or statements aimed at creating a false belief
in another person (Peskin, 1992; Sodian, 1991; Sodian, Taylor, Harris, &
Perner, 1991).
Almost without exception, the tasks used to study children’s developing
understanding of false belief have included an explicit invitation to supply a
judgement regarding someone’s belief. For example, children are explicitly
asked to say what they themselves said or thought about the content of a
closed Smartie-box before its real content was revealed, or alternatively
what someone else, who has not had access to the latter information, will say
or think about its content (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Mitchell & Lacohée,
1991; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987; Wimmer & Hartl, 1991). Even in
studies of deception, children have been explicitly asked to trick, mislead, or
withhold information from an opponent (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989;
Hala, Chandler, & Fritz, 1991; Sodian et al., 1991) or warned that an
opponent will exploit information for his/her own selsh ends (Peskin, 1992;
Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991; Sodian, 1991). Accordingly,
these studies cannot tell us whether children spontaneously deploy their
understanding of belief in everyday life. The present study aims to make a
start in lling this gap by studying the way that young children diagnose and
correct an interlocutor’s false belief in the course of conversation.
Recent research has highlighted the possibility that children’s theory of
mind is linked to their language ability. Thus, several studies have shown
that there is a correlation between verbal mental age and success on the false
belief task (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Happé, 1995; Jenkins & Astington,
1996). However, such correlational studies do not indicate whether children
diagnose a partner’s mental states, including his/her beliefs, in the course of
conversation. Happé (1993), on the other hand, provides an interesting
analysis of this possibility and some pertinent ndings. She argues that
conversation often calls for an interpretation of the intentions that motivate
a partner’s utterance. Consider a child who breaks something, and is then
told: “You’ve done a ne job”. The child will misunderstand this remark if
he/she treats it as an utterance that is intended literally rather than ironically.
Happé (1993) went on to show that children’s ability to interpret such
nonliteral statements correctly is associated with performance on false belief
tasks among normal children and children with autism. Even this analysis,
however, does not elucidate how an understanding of false belief in
particular—as opposed to a more general understanding of mental states
such as intentions—might contribute to conversational competence. This
was the goal of our study.
In everyday social interaction, children will often encounter a mismatch
between people’s reactions and what is really the case. For instance, a child’s
mother might say: “Someone needs to put out the dustbin”. A boy who has
just carried out that chore without his mother noticing it is likely to correct
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his mother’s mistake by saying: “I’ve just done it!” The implicit
conversational “contract” that people try to speak the truth as they know it
(Grice, 1975) combined with the knowledge that the mother did not see the
dustbin being taken out, makes it possible for the boy to infer the mother’s
informational status. Thus, the boy can reasonably assume that his mother
mistakenly thinks that he has not carried out the dustbin, and this warrants
the boy’s correction.
If children do diagnose and correct their partner’s mistaken beliefs, we
would expect them to provide corrective feedback when there is an obvious
danger of their partner entertaining a false belief and to omit such feedback
if there is no such danger. This prediction formed the basis of the present
study. In order to observe such corrective feedback, we constructed a
procedure that was a variant on two standard tasks for assessing false beliefs:
the unexpected transfer task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983); and the Smartie-
box task (Perner et al., 1987). The child’s conversation partner was absent
from the room when the contents of a familiar and easily recognisable
container (a pencil-case) were removed and transferred to a less familiar,
and less likely container (a plain box). Children witnessing this switch could
reasonably assume that their conversation partner, who had not seen it,
would on approaching the two boxes mistakenly expect pencils to be located
in the pencil-case rather than in the plain box. We observed what children
said when their partner announced that she needed to nd a pencil. More
specically, we observed how readily children offered corrective feedback to
their partner by pointing out that the pencils were not in the pencil-case but
in the plain box. For comparison purposes, a control condition was also run
in which the pencils remained in the pencil-case, obviating any need for
corrective feedback. It was anticipated that children would be more likely to
offer corrective feedback in the switched condition as compared to the
control or standard condition. To the extent that older children are more
likely to diagnose a false belief accurately, we also anticipated that this
difference between the two conditions would be more evident among
5-year-olds as compared with 3-year-olds.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 56 children was included in the nal sample, equally divided into a
younger group (14 girls; 14 boys) with a mean age of 3 years 6 months (range
35–48 months) and an older group (14 boys; 14 girls) with a mean age of 5
years 3 months (range 57–74 months). One additional 3-year-old was tested
but forgot the location of the pencils and was therefore not included in the
nal sample. Children were recruited from two preschools and one primary
school in the suburbs of the city of Amsterdam, The Netherlands. The
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children came from families that ranged from working to middle class. All
were uent in Dutch, the language in which testing was carried out.
Procedure
The children were individually tested by a team of two female experimenters
in a quiet room at their school or preschool. The whole session was recorded
by a concealed camera. After the children were put at ease, the rst
experimenter asked them to make a drawing of a house with a number of
colouring pencils that were put as a loose set in front of them. Once they had
nished this task children were routinely told: “That’s a very good drawing. I
like it very much. Now can you help me tidy up? Here are two boxes”. At this
point, the experimenter put the pencil-case (from which the pencils had
originally been taken) and a somewhat larger plain box in front of the
subject. She pointed to the pencil-case and said: “Ah, this looks like a proper
box for the pencils. Look, the pencils are shown on the lid. Can you put all
the pencils in this box?”
The children were randomly assigned to a standard and a switched
condition (7 girls and 7 boys from each age group in each condition). The
children in the standard condition drew with the original set of 12 pencils. In
the switched condition, however, 3 additional pencils had been added to the
set so that the entire set of 15 pencils would no longer t into the original
pencil-case. For this group, the experimenter said (when it became apparent
that the pencils would not t): “Oh dear, there are too many pencils. What
can we do? Let’s use the other box. It’s not a proper pencil box, but it will do.
Can you put the pencils in that one? Once the child had nished putting the
pencils in the box (i.e. the pencil-case in the standard condition and the plain
box in the switched condition), she concluded by saying: “Good, now let’s
leave everything ready on the table for the next child”. At this point, the
second experimenter entered the room.
The rst experimenter showed her the drawing saying: “Look what a nice
drawing [child’s name] has made . . .”, and then left the room “. . . to fetch the
next child”. The second experimenter looked at the drawing admiringly and
made some comments. Once she was sure that she had the child’s attention,
she said: “Well, because you’ve done such a nice drawing, I would like to give
you a small present. Look, what I’ve got for you!” She showed the child a
small eraser “puppet” that could be tted on top of a pencil. She then
presented a series of prompts. After each prompt, she waited for two
seconds for a reaction from the child. If the child failed to indicate the
location of the pencils, the experimenter went on to the next prompt. This
pace was judged sufcient to give the child an opportunity to respond
without introducing articially long silences into an otherwise normal
conversation.
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TABLE 1
The Number of Children who indicated the Location of the Pencils
after Each Prompt as a Function of Age and Condition
Number of Necessary Prompts
Age 0a 1 2 3 4 5b N
3-year-olds
Standard 0 5 0 2 1 6 14
Switched 1 3 0 5 2 3 14
5-year-olds
Standard 0 0 0 1 0 13 14
Switched 0 0 0 4 3 7 14
a Child who took a pencil out of the box before any of the prompts
were provided.
b Children who did not help spontaneously, but answered the direct
test question correctly.
1. “Look, it’s a nice little puppet, but it belongs on top of a pencil.
Look—here is the hole for the pencil” [showed the opening].
2. “Ah, didn’t you just make a drawing with some pencils?”
3. “Let me see. I need to nd a pencil for you.”
4. “Uhhmm . . . here’s a real pencil-box.”
If the child did not produce an appropriate reaction at this point, the
experimenter checked whether the child remembered the true state of
affairs by asking:
5. “Are there pencils in this box?”
One of the 3-year-olds did not answer this question correctly and was
therefore replaced by another subject. After the experiment, children were
thanked for their co-operation and given the puppet complete with a pencil.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the number of children who spontaneously indicated
(verbally and/or nonverbally) the location of the pencils either before any of
the prompts or following each of the ve prompts as a function of age and
condition.
In the standard condition, all but one of the 5-year-olds indicated the
location of the pencils only after the fth prompt (when they were explicitly
asked about their location) whereas in the switched condition half of the
5-year-olds indicated the location before the fth prompt. A Fisher exact
probability test, in which the proportion of reactions before and after the
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fth prompt were compared across the two conditions conrmed that this
difference was signicant (P , .025).
A different pattern emerged for the 3-year-olds: The majority indicated
the location of the pencils before the fth prompt in both conditions. This
trend was slightly more obvious in the switched condition, but a Fisher exact
probability test revealed no signicant effect of condition for the 3-year-
olds. However, closer inspection of Table 1 reveals an unexpected nding
among nine of the younger children. Although none of the older group
reacted before the third prompt when the plan to give a pencil to the child
was made explicit (“Let me see. I need to nd a pencil for you”), implying
that the two earlier prompts were too indirect to clarify the experimenter’s
intention, nine 3-year-olds offered information at a very early stage, namely,
before the second prompt. Almost all of these early reactions involved
children who grasped, or at least tried to grasp, the pencil themselves—a
nonverbal action that was not necessarily an attempt to help the
experimenter or an acknowledgement that help was needed. Admittedly, in
so doing, children revealed the location of the pencils but that was a
by-product of their search rather than an attempt to provide the
experimenter with information. By contrast, the other children, 3- and
5-year-olds alike, typically revealed their intention to help by pointing at the
correct box rather than opening it, sometimes accompanied by a remark
such as: “Here [are the pencils]”.
If these nine children are excluded from the younger group, the remaining
3-year-olds displayed the same trend as the 5-year-olds but given the smaller
number of children involved the trend was not signicant by Fisher exact
probability test. In order to assess the overall pattern of the ndings, the
nineteen 3-year-olds were combined with the entire group of 5-year-olds.
Logistic regression analysis (SPSS) was used to examine the effects of Age
and Condition on the proportion of children who provided information to
their conversation partner, either before (score 5 0) or after (score 5 1) the
fth prompt. We started with a saturated model in which both main effects
and their interaction were entered as independent variables. This analysis
revealed that the interaction effect of Condition 3 Age did not reach
signicance (G2 5 0.468, df 5 1, P 5 .494). Once this interaction effect was
removed from the model, the main effect of Condition was clearly signicant
(G2 5 9.035, df 5 1, P 5 .003) and the main effect of Age was marginally
signicant (G2 5 3.100, df 5 1, P 5 .078).
When this analysis was repeated on the entire sample, a similar pattern
emerged. After removal of the nonsignicant interaction effect (G2 5 1.261,
df 5 1, P 5 .262), there was a signicant effect of Condition (G2 5 7.124, df 5
1, P 5 .008) and of Age (G2 5 10.120, df 5 1, P 5 .002). We may draw two
conclusions. First, irrespective of age, children were more likely to provide
information before the fth prompt in the switched as compared with the
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standard condition; second, irrespective of condition, younger children were
more likely than older children to provide information before the fth
prompt.
DISCUSSION
The pattern of help provided by children varied across the two conditions
suggesting that children took their interlocutor’s knowledge-base into
account. This effect was clear among the older children, but a similar trend
appeared among those younger children who informed the experimenter
rather than searching themselves for the pencils. The rst two prompts were
ineffective, but when the adult, after clearly stating her intention “to nd the
pencils” in prompt 3, appeared likely to be misled by the switched location,
children often foresaw this problem and supplied information about the
actual location before being explicitly asked for that information in prompt
5. In the standard condition, on the other hand, in which the pencils could be
found in their proper box, children assumed that the adult would be able to
nd them. In these circumstances, they were likely to withhold information
about the location of the pencils until explicitly asked about their location in
the nal prompt.
As we indicated in the introduction, studies that have focused on
children’s developing understanding of belief have, almost without
exception, included a direct invitation to supply a judgement regarding
someone’s belief. By contrast, in the present task, children were not
explicitly asked to say what the adult thought nor warned that the adult
needed to know. Nevertheless, children supplied—or withheld—
information in accordance with the adult’s likely knowledge-base. It is worth
emphasising that care was taken to avoid the introduction of long periods of
silence between one experimental prompt and the next (see method
section). Arguably, children might have provided more information if the
experimenter had remained silent for longer. For the moment, however,
the ndings indicate that children spontaneously diagnose and correct the
beliefs of another person even when the conversation includes no explicit
verbal request for information (until the nal prompt) and only weak
nonverbal prompting, in the form of brief pauses by an interlocutor.
Earlier research has shown that young children, especially 4- and
5-year-olds, are capable of making two different judgements about another
person’s beliefs. They realise that when someone is shown a familiar and
distinctive container such as a Smartie-box, he/she will expect it to contain its
standard contents. Children also realise that if those contents have been
removed without warning, the person will continue to hold the same
expectation about the likely contents, even though that expectation is
actually false (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Perner et al., 1987; Wimmer &
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Hartl, 1991). Both of these judgements appear to have been at work in the
present study. In the standard condition, when the pencils were put in a
familiar and distinctive container, children were likely to leave the adult to
nd the pencils for herself. Indeed, among the 5-year-olds, only one child
supplied information about their location before being explicitly asked to do
so. The implication is that children assumed that the adult would realise that
the pencils were in the pencil-box; such an expectation was reasonable
because the pencil-case had a picture of pencils on it, and had been
categorised as a pencil-case in the course of the interaction with the rst
experimenter.
It is possible, of course, that older children remained silent because they
did not want to appear impolite by being too eager to have a pencil.
Certainly, no older child took matters “into their own hands” as did some of
the younger children, and even as compared to the remaining 3-year-olds,
older children needed more prompts to offer information. However, the
behaviour of the older children cannot be entirely attributed to a politeness
rule because in that case, a similar pattern (i.e. withholding information until
the fth and nal prompt) should have been observed in both conditions.
However, in the switched condition children were likely to draw attention to
the switch of location before being explicitly asked whether the pencils were
in the pencil-case. Although the rst two prompts proved to be ineffective in
eliciting a reaction, children spontaneously intervened when the
experimenter made it clear that she wanted to nd a pencil for the child (i.e.
prompt 3: “Let me see. I need to nd a pencil for you”) or when she focused
on the (empty) pencil-case (i.e. prompt 4: “Uhhmm . . . here’s a real
pencil-box”).
The performance of the younger children needs to be interpreted with
caution especially since a small subsample of younger children showed an
unexpected reaction. A possible interpretation consistent with much of
the research on children’s developing understanding of belief, is that the
3-year-olds did not assess what the experimenter might infer about the
location of the pencils. Instead, knowing the location of the pencils
themselves, they egocentrically assumed (in both conditions) that the
experimenter shared that knowledge. This would be consistent with the
standard error pattern in false-belief tasks in which children attribute
knowledge to someone, even if that person has not had perceptual access to
some critical piece of information. However, inspection of Table 1
undermines this interpretation. Had children assumed that the
experimenter knew the location of the pencils, they should have supplied
that information only after prompt 5, as did almost all of the 5-year-olds in
the standard condition. Yet only a minority of 3-year-olds adopted this tactic
in either condition. Indeed, even if we focus on 3-year-olds who did not take
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matters “into their own hands”, they still supplied information somewhat
earlier than older children.
A second possibility is that 3-year-olds did try to analyse the situation
from the interlocutor’s perspective, but used the simple rule that: “Not
Seeing 5 Not Knowing”. Because the second experimenter had not seen the
pencils being put into either of the two boxes, she would have no knowledge
of their location. This line of argument implies that 3-year-olds overlook the
possibility that their interlocutor will be guided by the external appearance
of the pencil-case to search there for pencils and assume instead that she has
no idea where they are. Inspection of Table 1 provides some support for this
interpretation because the majority of 3-year-olds in each condition
responded before prompt 5.
We cannot rule out this second interpretation, but a third possibility is also
plausible. First, recall that many 3-year-olds took matters “into their own
hands” and searched for a pencil. This impulse may have masked a
sensitivity to the experimenter’s likely beliefs. That such a sensitivity exists is
suggested by the trend observed in the remaining 3-year-olds. However, in
arguing that the behaviour of this latter group reects the level of
understanding of all 3-year-olds, we must assume that the impulsive reaction
pattern does not reect a limitation in theory of mind abilities. This
conclusion seems plausible in the light of ndings by Lalonde and Chandler
(1995). They distinguished between mastery of social conventions or the
exercise of self-control, on the one hand, and more mentalistic or empathic
social competence on the other (p. 167). None of the abilities from the rst
cluster showed any relation to the children’s understanding of false beliefs.
Therefore, we may conclude that the theory of mind of the nine excluded
3-year-olds was no less advanced than that of the remaining 3-year-olds.
Nevertheless, given the small number of subjects in the latter group, our
conclusions regarding their sensitivity to the experimenter’s beliefs must
remain tentative. In future research, it will be important to devise a
procedure in which children cannot retrieve the missing items themselves.
This will allow us to assess whether 3-year-olds do ignore the interlocutor’s
inferential abilities or can take them into account.
Finally, we may turn to the broader question of the relation between the
development of language and the development of a child’s theory of mind.
We discern two major positions in the contemporary literature. First, some
theorists propose that advances in the child’s acquisition of a theory of mind
facilitate the child’s acquisition and use of language. For example, as noted
in the introduction, Happé (1993) argues that advances in children’s
understanding of intention aids the comprehension of gurative language.
By contrast, other theorists have proposed that children’s limited language
skills may mask an otherwise intact understanding of mind. For example,
Siegal and his colleagues (Siegal & Beattie, 1991; Siegal & Peterson, 1994)
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argue that the assumptions that young children bring to a conversation may
mask their understanding of belief.
Notwithstanding radical differences among these various proposals, they
all carry no implication that the development of children’s understanding of
mind is affected by the development of language. In the case of Happé
(1993), it is assumed that any causal inuence works in the opposite
direction—developments in the child’s understanding of mind affect the
development of language. In the case of Siegal and Peterson (1994), it is
assumed that the age-change in children’s understanding of beliefs is more
apparent than real, so that there is no genuine development to explain,
whether by the development of language or otherwise.
In contrast to these proposals, we speculate that children’s engagement in
conversation does have an important impact on their understanding of mind.
Admittedly, other authors have made this type of claim (Dunn, 1994; Smith,
1996). However, they have emphasised the possibility that the explicit verbal
identication of particular mental states facilitates the child’s understanding
of mind. By contrast, we would argue that even when a conversation includes
no explicit reference to any mental state, it can nonetheless provide an
important context in which to discover that your interlocutor does not have
the same knowledge and beliefs as yourself (Harris, 1996). For example,
each time children pose a simple question (e.g. “Where’s Daddy?”) and
receive an informative reply (e.g. “In the kitchen”), they receive a
demonstration that their knowledge base is not equivalent to that of another
person. Sometimes, as in the foregoing exchange, they are ignorant of some
piece of information that their interlocutor knows. At other times, the roles
will be reversed, and they can provide information to their interlocutor.
More generally, we assume that the opportunity to participate in
conversation is likely to augment children’s sensitivity to variation among
people in what they know and believe, whereas obstacles to such
participation is likely to delay that sensitivity. Consistent with this argument,
it is noteworthy that deaf children have recently been shown to have
difculties with the false belief task (Peterson & Siegel, 1995).
Whatever the ultimate merits of this speculation about causal links
between participation in conversation and the development of a theory of
mind, the present results highlight the fact that communication often calls
for an assessment of what an interlocutor believes. In that respect, the study
of children’s communication skills may be seen as an important, albeit
neglected, context in which to observe their sensitivity to other people’s
beliefs.
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